Metaparticles
 

FOREWORD

The Metaparticle Theory has been in the process of development since l978.  There have of course been many efforts to "reconcile" physics with metaphysics, and this may be counted among them.  But whereas other theorists often saddle themselves with definitions pitting subjective data against the empirical methods of science, we have suggested a way to stay clear of such arguments.

This can be done with good reason by separating metaphysics itself into its "substantive" and "conscient" aspects. The latter encompasses all that concerns the interplay of consciousness with realms of thought and systems of belief involving imponderables in the physical sense.  Substantive metaphysics, on the other hand, is restricted to the origins, gradations, and structure of matter as recognized at the primordial and elementary stages of subatomic particles.  The fact that many such gradations are presently invisible and inferential does not challenge their reality -- providing the goal remains always to bring about understanding, in scientifically evidential terms, of how elementary particles are produced from an ultimate source that exceeds what we consider to be materiality.

Consequently Metaparticles neither confirms nor opposes religions or other metaphysical belief systems, though we do argue against the reality of "nothingness" and the longterm futility of life.  It is true that our initial impetus came from highly specific, very condensed data found in writings of unknown origin.  But the fact that new, workable models of the electron evolved from such a source does not make us mystics any more than it makes us scientists. We simply thought our results should gain exposure and have tried to do that, despite the fact that as the foremost contributor to metaparticle theory, I possess no scientific credentials.

(On the other hand it is clear that had I managed to become a professional in even the outskirts of physics, I would doubtless have had a mobile career. Immediately after putting even a slightly "metaphysical" theory on the Internet I would have been moved to lab assistant.)

A very reasonable question that is asked about the theory is this:  If you start with an imaginary premise, tailored to fit certain "clues" of uncertain provenance, how can you be confident that your electron model is not fictitious?  The answer is because both forms of that model, two-and three-dimensional, fit known facts of electron behavior.  And further, our bipolar models fit those facts better than the single-point model science made do with for decades -- despite creating several enigmas over which only quantum mechanics could build a satisfactory bridge.

If a new model works, it should no longer be thought fictitious.  Especially not if it supports the reality of the foundational premise underlying it -- in this case a physically imperceptible "field" of dynamic energy whose laws dictated the eventual model.  A general principle suggests the forms of specific particles;  the particle models fit the demands of electron behavior.  That demonstrable fact then reflects positively (though not exclusively) upon the foundational "field", does it not?  The process might be described as reciprocal evidence between causes and results.

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Let us welcome you to whatever you may find interesting or incredible, irritating or amusing in Metaparticles.  We began this Website in 2002 with minimal expectations and considerable trepidation.  At the time of substituting this new Foreword in June of 2004, we are pleased and surprised at the turn of events.  This distinctly does not mean we are smiled upon by any facet of Science whatever.  But they are, for the present, allowing Metaparticles to speak its piece.

 



COMPUTER CHARTS AND DIAGRAMS ILLUSTRATING THIS THEORY WERE DONE BY CHARLES BUEKER FROM THE MID-80s TO JUNE, 2001 AT THE AUTHOR’S REQUEST. (With subsequent additions.)
       


THE METAPARTICLE THEORY WAS FIRST FORMULATED BY ANTHONY PAUL PERELLA IN 1978. IT WAS WRITTEN BY HIM IN THE PRESENT FORM SEPTEMBER - MAY, 2001/02. (With subsequent additions.)

  

 


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